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NEW YORK HOLDS ADOPTED CHILDREN NOT WITHIN
MEANING OF "DESCENDANTS"
In re Rick's Trust
10 N.Y2d 231, 176 N.E.2d 726, 219 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1961)
The natural grandchildren of the settlor of an inter vivos trust which
established their father as primary life beneficiary with remainder to his
"descendants" brought this action against the adopted children of the father,
natural children of his third wife. The New York Court of Appeals in a 4 to
3 decision' affirmed the holding of the Appellate Division2 that these adopted
children were not within the meaning of the word "descendants" of the
primary life beneficiary despite an affidavit filed by the settlor (who was
still living) which stated a definite intent to include such adopted children
within the class.3 The New York Court of Appeals found the language of the
trust instrument unambiguous and therefore refused to consider the sub-
sequent affidavit of the settlor explaining her intent to include adopted
children within the term "descendants."
The decision rests partly on a New York statute designed to prevent
fraud when the provisions of an instrument make the "passing or limitation
over of real or personal property dependent ...on the foster parent dying
without heirs."'4 The statute had previously been construed as intended merely
to prevent fraud where a contingent remainder could be cut off by an
"adoption for the very purpose of cutting out a remainder."' Here there was
obviously no such fraudulent intent in the adoption of the defendants by the
primary life beneficiary.
The right of adoption was unknown to the common law of England and
exists in this country only by virtue of statute.6 However, contrary to most
I In re Rick's Trust, 10 N.Y.2d 231, 176 N.E.2d 726, 219 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1961).
2 In re Rick's Trust, 12 App. Div. 2d 395, 212 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1961).
3 The affidavit of the settlor is quoted by Fuld, J., dissenting at 10 N.Y.2d at 236-7,
176 N.E.2d at 728, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 33-4: "I assumed that an adopted child was con-
sidered to be the same as a natural child. ... [If any problem had arisen ... I would
have instructed my attorney to use whatever language was necessary to include adopted
children.... [Ilt was not my intention to exclude adopted children from participation
in the trust fund."
4 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117.
5 In re Walter's Estate, 270 N.Y. 201, 206, 200 N.E. 786, 788 (1936). See also In re
Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y. 366, 107 N.E.2d 492 (1952) ; In re Leask, 197 N.Y. 193, 90 N.E.
652 (1910); In re Horn's Will, 256 N.Y. 294, 176 N.E. 399 (1931); In re Charles' Estate,
200 Misc. 452, 102 N.Y.S.2d 497 (Surr. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 741, 109 N.Y.S.2d
103 (1951), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 776, 109 N.E.2d 76 (1952). Moreover, previous decisions had
held the section would not defeat the intent of a settlor or testator. See e.g., 2 N.Y. Jur.
Adoption § 18 (1958); In re Ward's Will, 9 App. Div. 2d 950, 195 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1959),
aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 722, 174 N.E.2d 326 (1961); In re Day's Trust, 10 App. Div. 2d 950, 195
N.Y.S.2d 760 (1960); Pross v. Anson, 273 App. Div. 860, 76 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1948), aff'd,
298 N.Y. 718, 83 N.E.2d 16 (1948).
6 1 Am. Jur. Adoption of Children § 3 (1936); In re Thorne's Estate, 155 N.Y. 140,
49 N.E. 661 (1898); Sommers v. Doersam, 115 Ohio St. 139, 152 N.E. 387 (1926).
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statutes in derogation of the common law, adoption statutes are now gen-
erally regarded as intended to make a complete change in the common law,
and the prevailing tendency is in the direction of a liberal construction.
7
Moreover, the statute law itself has been gradually broadened for the benefit
of the adopted child and the protection of his rights. New York law today
regards the foster parent and child in "the legal relation of parent and child," s
and the legislative history of the act states a purpose "to make it clear that
members of the same family are to be treated as in all respects on a parity
with each other so far as intra-family property rights are concerned."0
Despite this clear announcement of policy, the courts continue to make
fine distinctions when the words "child,"10 "next of kin,"" "heir,"' 2 "heir at
7 Kroff v. Amrhein, 94 Ohio St. 282, 286, 114 N.E. 267, 268 (1916): "The courts
should apply the language in the broad and humane spirit in which it was written into
the law and policy of the state." See also In re Walter's Estate, supra note 5; In re
Hecker's Estate, 178 Misc. 449, 33 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Surr. Ct. 1942) ; In re Foster's Estate,
108 Misc. 604, 177 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1919); Matter of Gregory, 15 Misc. 407, 37
N.Y. Supp. 925 (Surr. Ct. 1896); Flynn v. Bredbeck, 147 Ohio St. 49, 68 N.E.2d 75
(1946); Frame v. Shaffer, 27 Ohio Op. 346, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 617 (C.P. 1943). But cf.
Adams v. Nadel, 124 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Matter of Bamber, 147 Misc. 712,
265 N.Y. Supp. 798 (Surr. Ct. 1933); In re Martin's Will, 133 Misc. 80, 230 N.Y. Supp.
734 (Surr. Ct. 1928); Campbell v.-Musart Society, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 46, 131 N.E.2d 279
(P. Ct. 1956); Re Wed], 65 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 114 N.E.2d 311 (P. Ct. 1952).
8 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117. See also In re Upjohn's Will, supra note 5, at 373, 107
N.E.2d at 494: "Embodied in our adoption statute is the fundamental social concept that
the relationship of parent and child, with all the personal and property rights incident
to it may be established, independently of blood ties, by operation of law, and that has
been a part of the public policy of this state since 1887."
) Draftsman's Note to N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117.
10 Matter of Horn, 256 N.Y. 294, 176 N.E. 399 (1931); In re Walter's Estate, supra
note 5; Bell v. Terry & Trench Co., 177 App. Div. 123, 163 N.Y. Supp. 733 (1917); In re
Charles' Estate, supra note 5; In re Horvath's Estate, 155 Misc. 734, 279 N.Y. Supp. 189
(Surr. Ct. 1935); In re Hulbert's Will, 28 Misc. 2d 160, 213 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Surr. Ct.
1961); Staker v. Industrial Commission, 127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 616 (1933); Surman
v. Surman, 114 Ohio St. 579, 151 N.E. 708 (1926); Ransom v. N.Y.C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
93 Ohio St. 223, 112 N.E. 586 (1915); Tiedtke v. Tiedtke, 91 Ohio App. 442, 108 N.E.2d
578 (1951). But cf. In re Leask, supra note 5; In re Cook's Will, 8 Misc. 2d 103, 165
N.Y.S.2d 806 (Surr. Ct. 1957) ; In re Hall's Will, 127 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Surr. Ct. 1954) ; In re
Stecher's Will, 190 Misc. 502, 73 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Central Trust Co. v.
Hart, 82 Ohio App. 450, 80 N.E.2d 920 (1948); Rodgers v. Miller, 43 Ohio App. 198, 182
N.E. 654 (1932).
11 U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Hoyt, 223 N.Y. 616, 119 N.E. 1083 (1915); Carpenter
v. Buffalo General Electric Co., 213 N.Y. 101, 106 N.E. 1026 (1914); In re Hecker's
Estate, supra note 7. But cf. Matter of Hall, 141 Misc. 169, 252 N.Y. Supp. 592 (Surr.
Ct. 1931, aff'd, 234 App. Div. 151, 254 N.Y. Supp. 564 (1931), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 637, 182
N.E. 214 (1932).
12 In re Hecker's Estate, supra note 7. But cf. In re Sandford's Estate, 160 Misc. 898,
290 N.Y. Supp. 959 (Surr. Ct. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 250 App. Div. 310, 293 N.Y.
Supp. 991 (1937).
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law,)" 3 icssue, " 14 or "descendants"' 5 are used in wills, trusts or statutes.
Whether each of these terms includes adopted children, illegitimate children
or after-born children unknown to the testator or settlor are questions often
raised in construing instruments. Often the courts turn to the intent of the
testator which is usually difficult to determine by extraneous circumstances,
subject to distortion by court-made presumptions of questionable merit, and
presumably unnecessary since well-worn words of legal significance have been
employed.
In Ohio, progressive legislation'6 and liberal court interpretation have
13 Gilliam v. Guaranty Trust Co., 111 App. Div. 656, 97 N.Y. Supp. 758 (1906),
aff'd, 186 N.Y. 127, 78 N.E. 697 (1906); Smith v. Hunter, 86 Ohio St. 106, 99 N.E. 91
(1912) ; Tiedtke v. Tiedtke, supra note 10. But cf. Matter of Hall, supra note 11.
14 In re Day's Trust, supra note 5; In re Estate of Lynde, 28 Misc. 2d 174, 211
N.Y.S.2d 493 (Surr. Ct. 1961); Cochrel v. Robinson, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871
(1925); Miller v. Shepard, 29 Ohio App. 22, 162 N.E. 788 (1928); Campbell v. Musart
Society, supra note 7. But cf. In re Holt's Estate, 206 Misc. 789, 134 N.Y.S.2d 416 (Surr.
Ct. 1954); In re Price's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 1026, 156 N.Y.S.2d 901 (Sup. Ct. 1956); In re
Hosford's Estate, 203 Misc. 146, 116 N.Y.S.2d 138 (Surr. Ct. 1952), aff'd 282 App. Div.
1026, 126 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1953); rev'd on other grounds, 309 N.Y. 23, 127 N.E.2d 735
(1955); Central Trust Co. v. Hart, supra note 10; Rodgers v. Miller, supra note 10. See
also Annot., 2 A.L.R. 974 (1919); Notes, 19 Ohio Op. 405 (1941), 20 Ohio Op. 250 (1941).
15 In re Cook's Estate, supra note 8, at 261, 79 N.E. at 994 (1907): "[TIhe words
'lineal descendant' . . . must be read in connection with the statute governing the effect
of adoption .... A lineal descendant is one who is in the line of descent from a certain
person, but, since the Domestic Relations Law went into effect, not necessarily in the
line of generation. The line of descent is the course that property takes according to
law when the owner dies. By force of the statute, that course is the same in the case of
adopted children, that it is in the case of own children. In the eye of the law, therefore,
adopted children are lineal descendants of their foster parent. They are in the line of
descent from him through the command of the statute, the same as if that line had been
established by nature."
In re Fedder's Will, 187 Misc. 207, 214-5, 61 N.Y.S.2d 340, 346-7 (Surr. Ct. 1946):
"'Descendant' is not limited in its meaning to a person who proceeds from the body of
another, but also means one on whom the law has cast the property by descent, and in
this sense, the term is frequently held to include an adopted child and that such child is
as lawfully in the line of descent as if placed there by birth.... EAin adopted daughter
is a lineal descendant of a foster parent through the command of statute." In re Upjohn's
Will, supra note 5; In re Day's Trust, supra note 5; In re Weller's Will, 7 Misc. 2d 366,
165 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Application of Chase National Bank of City of New
York, 102 N.Y.S.2d 124 (Sup. Ct. 1950). But cf. In re Fisk's Trust, 27 Misc. 2d 60, 209
N.Y.S.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Brunton, 74 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup.
Ct. 1954). See also Annot., 70 A.L.R. 621 (1931); Annot., 133 A.L.R. 597 (1941); Annot.,
144 A.L.R. 670 (1943); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 150 (1947).
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.13 on "Legal Rights After Adoption" reads in part:
... For all purposes under the laws of this state, including without limitation all laws
and wills governing inheritance of and succession to real or personal property and the
taxation of such inheritance and succession, a legally adopted child shall have the same
legal status and rights, and shall bear the same legal relation to the adopting parents as
if born to them in lawful wedlock and not born to the natural parents; provided: (A) such
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gone far toward achieving the goal of eliminating petty legal distinctions in
the relation of adopted children to their adopting parents and collateral rela-
tives. As early as 1916, Ohio courts showed a forward-looking approach to
the problems of the legal relation and status of adopted children:
To lawyer and layman, it should be perfectly plain that the legisla-
tive intent... was to make such adopted child the equivalent of a
natural child of the adopting parent. . . Such simple, sweeping
language would seem sufficient per se to invest the adopted child
with all the rights and privileges of the natural child. Lest there be
any doubts in the minds of the superstrict as to the legal sense and
scope.., the legislators further enacted ... "such child shall be the
child and legal heir.., entitled to all the rights and privileges and
subject to all the obligations of a child of such person begotten in
lawful wedlock.' 17
Occasional Ohio cases still limit the rights of adopted children, but these
decisions are usually based upon a specific finding of the testator's intent.' 8
The more reasonable view is that the adoption statute "was designed to give
an adopted child the same rights of inheritance from ancestors and other
relatives of the adopting parents as are enjoyed by a consanguineous child.
..."19 The only remaining exception to this policy in Ohio is the "heirs of the
adopted child shall not be capable of inheriting or succeeding to property expressly
limited to heirs of the body of the adopting parents ......
Frame v. Shaffer, supra note 7, at 346, 39 Ohio L. Abs. at 618: "[Tihe legislative
acts ... have had a strong tendency to favor the adopted child-a tendency, it appears,
to concede to the adopted child the same rights as though he or she had the blood of
the adoptive parents in his or her veins."
17 Kroff v. Amrhein, supra note 7, at 284, 114 N.E. at 267-8. See also In re Estate
of Friedman, 154 Ohio St. 1, 93 N.E. 273 (1950); Flynn v. Bredbeck, supra note 7;
White v. Meyer, 66 Ohio App. 549, 37 N.E.2d 546 (1940).
18 See, e.g., Third National Bank & Trust v. Davidson, 157 Ohio St. 355, 105 N.E.2d
573 (1952). But cf. dissent of Chief Justice Weygandt in that case at 157 Ohio St. 367,
105 N.E.2d 579: "If such child would take if it had been a natural born child of the
adopting parent, it will take though adopted, it being the purpose of the provision (now
Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.13) that such adopted child should not be denied the right of
inheritance upon the sole ground that it was adopted and not natural born."
19 In re Friedman, supra note 18, at 9, 93 N.E.2d at 277. Ohio and New York law
differ fundamentally on this point, since in New York an adopted child may inherit from
but not through his adopting parents. 1 N.Y. Jur. Adoption § 16 (1958) ; In re Hodges
Will, 294 N.Y. 58, 60 N.E.2d 540 (1945); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 202 App. Div. 606, 195
N.Y. Supp. 605 (1922), aff'd, 236 N.Y. 545, 142 N.E. 277 (1923); Winkler v. New York
Car Wheel Co., 181 App. Div. 239, 168 N.Y. Supp. 826 (1917); In re Timpkin's Trust,
142 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Re Fodor, 202 Misc. 1100, 117 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Surr.
Ct. 1952); In re Charles' Estate, supra note 5; Re Hall's Estate, 141 Misc. 169, 252 N.Y.
Supp. 592 (1931), aff'd, 234 App. Div. 151, 254 N.Y. Supp. 564 (1931), aff'd, 259 N.Y. 637,
182 N.E. 214 (1932); Re Brenner's Estate, 149 Misc. 412, 267 N.Y. Supp. 765 (Surr. Ct.
1933); Kettel v. Baxter, 50 Misc. 428, 100 N.Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1906). But cf. 1
Ohio Jur. 2d Adoption of Children § 24 (1953); Staley v. Honeyman, 157 Ohio St. 61,
105 N.E.2d 573 (1952); Flynn v. Bredbeck, supra note 7; White v. Meyer, supra note
17; Shearer v. Gasstman, 15 Ohio L. Abs. 103, 31 Ohio NP. (n.s.) 219 (P. Ct. 1933).
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body" limitation2 ° On the specific question of whether an adopted child is
a "descendant," Ohio courts have been explicit in including the adopted child
within the term. In Re Estate of Friedman, the court stated:
The language of the Code gives a legally adopted child the right
to inherit property not only from but through the adopting parent.
... And it seems apparent that the legislative intent was to give the
adopted child every right and privilege of inheritance accorded a
natural child, excepting only the inheritance of property "expressly
limited to the heirs of the body of the adopting parent or parents." It
further puts such child in a direct line of ancestry the same as if it
had been born in lawful wedlock. It makes such child a lineal
descendant. 21
As a matter of policy, the still-developing law of adoption has undergone
vast statutory revision and rethinking in this century. The trend has been
to eliminate the legal distinctions between adopted children and natural
children, and most states including New York22 and Ohio23 profess to have
achieved this goal. However, these broad revisions of the law have been re-
tarded by a hesitancy to depart from the historical common law concepts
of property rights and respect for blood lines. As a result, despite the statutes
which purport to make the adopted child "for all purposes" the same legally
as a natural-born child, some courts-notably in New York-are reluctant to
apply these standards to their logical conclusion but have, in fact, developed
See also Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1183 (1955); Note, 7 Ohio St. L.J. 441 (1941); Note, 8 Ohio
St. L.J. 113 (1941).
20 Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.13 (1961).
21 86 Ohio App. 97, 103, 88 N.E.2d 230, 233 (1949), rev'd on other grounds, 154
Ohio St. 1, 93 N.E.2d 273 (1950). The Friedman case is an excellent example of the
curious, unpredictable, and unjust results which have been reached when courts approach
the problems of adoption with diverse rules of construction which frustrate the liberal
policy of the law in the area. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the quoted statement
as to inheritance and succession since it found the adoption statute and succession statute
in pari materia; however, it found the adoption statute and the inheritance tax statute not
in pari ,nateria and because tax statutes must be construed strictly against the taxpayer,
would not include the adopted child within the "other lineal descendant of the dece-
dent" class of exemptions. This anomaly seems to have been erased from Ohio law by
amended Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.13 (1961). See Taft, "Some Problems Under the Adop-
tion Laws of Ohio," 13 Ohio St. L.J. 48, 65 (1952). See also Blackwell v. Bowman, 150
Ohio St. 34, 80 N.E.2d 493 (1948); Flynn v. Bredbeck, supra note 7; White v. Meyer,
supra note 17; In re Griffin, 19 Ohio Op. 377, 33 Ohio L. Abs. 270 (P. Ct. 1935); Annot.,
51 A.L.R.2d 854 (1957).
22 N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 117: "Effect of Adoption-The foster parents or parent
and the child shall sustain toward each other the legal relation of parent and child and
shall have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation including the
rights of inheritance from each other."
Draftsman's Note to § 117: "The text of the proposed act specifies that in a family
where there are both foster children and natural children there shall be no distinction
among the children as to their rights of inheritance from each other. "
23 Ohio Rev. Code § 3107.13 (1961).
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contrary rules of presumptions.2 4 This concept is outmoded and illogical in
the present context of our society in which the adoption of children is an
accepted social institution recognized as beneficial to the child and to the
society.25 American courts, which have been reluctant to apply the adoption
statutes as the legislatures have obviously intended that they should operate,
would do well to follow the progressive position of Canada where adopted
children are presumed to be included in any class gift unless a clear intent not
to include them is shown 2 6
Although adoption statutes in the United States are a relatively recent
innovation,2 7 they are suddenly behind the times. The basis of most states'
adoption statutes stems from 1900 and so is "based primarily on an aware-
ness of child welfare as it existed at the turn of the century."28 Since that
24 1 N.Y. Jur. Adoption § 18 (1958): "What the testator meant when he used the
words 'issue' and 'descendants' is not to be decided in vacuo. The rule in this state ...
is that the limitation will be construed to designate only those related to the named
ancestor by blood if there is nothing to the contrary to be found in the context of the
instrument, or in extraneous facts proper to be considered .... [I]n the absence of any
indication of the testator's intent, it will be assumed that the testator did not envisage
adopted children taking under the limitation."
But cf. Merrill, "Toward Uniformity in Adoption Law," 40 Iowa L. Rev. 299, 319
(1955): "It seems better social engineering to make those who strongly dislike the idea
of property going away from the blood line or who disapprove of a particular in-
dividual take the initiative, than to exclude . .. many who, in all but blood, have been
as close as, or closer than, the so-called next of kin to the deceased."
See also In re Charles' Estate, supra note 5; In re Cohn's Estate, 184 Misc. 258, 55
N.Y.S.2d 797 (Surr. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 271 App. Div. 776, 66 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1946), aff'd,
297 N.Y. 536, 74 N.E.2d 471 (1947); In re Fisk's Trust, supra note 15; Re Bergen's Will,
27 Misc. 2d 804, 208 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Surr. Ct. 1960); Re Peabody's Will, 17 Misc. 2d 656,
185 N.Y.S.2d 591 (Surr. Ct. 1959); Estate of Tainter, 222 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Surr. Ct. 1961);
New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 161 N.Y. 11, 55 N.E. 311 (1899); In re Dudley's
Will, 168 Misc. 695, 6 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Surr. Ct. 1938); In re Hubbard's Trust, 15 App. Div.
2d 131, 222 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1961); Third National Bank & Trust v. Davidson, supra note
18.
2Z 1 Ohio Jur. 2d Adoption of Children § 2 (1953): "The sound public policy of this
legislation is certainly no longer open to debate. The adoption laws are founded upon
broad humanitarian principles which in their operation strengthen the social fabric at
points where it was formerly weak indeed."
26 Kennedy, "Legal Effects of Adoption," 33 Can. B. Rev. 751, 840-1 (1955):
. [T]he old rule of construction is reversed for adopted children. . . . The word
'child' or its equivalent in any will, conveyance, or other instrument shall include an
adopted child unless the contrary plainly appears by the terms of the instrument ...
Adopted children would be included in gifts expressed to be to a testator's child, children,
sons, daughters, issue, grandchildren, and any other words referring to testator's de-
scendants."
27 Although the practice dates back to Roman law and beyond, the first American
statutes were those of Mississippi in 1846 and Massachusetts in 1851. The first New York
adoption statute was enacted in 1873.
28 Bernknopf, "An Evaluation of the Uniform Adoption Act," 12 N.Y.U. Intra. L.
Rev. 57, 59 (1956).
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time, the factual setting of these problems has changed enormously and the
need to clarify the entire field of law is urgent. The number of adoption
petitions filed in recent years has increased phenomenally 2 9 The need for
unification and reorganization was recognized when the Uniform Commis-
sioners authorized a Uniform Adoption Act in 1951 and approved the work
so drawn in 1953. It embodies the concepts that the adopted child should
be a full member of his new family for all purposes and be severed com-
pletely from knowledge of his natural family. In implementing this policy, it
allows the adopted child to inherit both from and through his adopting
parents. 30 Both of these basic ideas are now a part of Ohio's statutes on adop-
tion.
The ultimate goal of eradicating the legal distinctions in the status and
rights of an adopted child as compared to those of a natural child is hindered
when courts resort to the "feudal favoritism accorded to blood relatives under
the common law"-3 1 -especially when it is against the clearly-stated intent of
the testator or settlor as in the principal case. The law in this area is out of
step with the times, and when courts resort to the anachronism of blood ties
in such a setting, they fail to "recognize what is true socially." 32
The adoption statutes do not stand isolated and alone. They function
as an integrated part of our law, and the corresponding laws, especially of
property and inheritance, must complement the policies and development of
the law of adoption if they are to be effective.3 3 This social goal must be
29 Merrill, supra note 24.
30 Uniform Adoption Act § 12(1)(2) (1953).
Merrill, supra note 24, at 318-9: "[Tlhe successful adoption brings the adoptee into
the clan as completely as does the process of birth. There is full acceptance by the col-
laterals as well as the immediate family circle .... It is a sad fortuity when one who
has been regarded as in all respects a member of the family fails to share an inheritance
which comes to others who probably were no whit more beloved by the deceased....
To the Committee of the Conference which drafted the Uniform Adoption Act, the
weight of policy seemed to fall with overwhelming preponderance upon the side of bring-
ing the adoptee fully into the clan. Accordingly they provided for such a result in dear
language, specifying that adoption should bring into existence 'all rights, duties, and other
legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent,' not only as between the
adoptee and the adoptive parents, but also as between the adoptee and the kindred of
the adoptive parents."
31 Note, "Status of Adopted Children in Ohio Under Devise by Ancestor of Adopting
Parent to Issue," 190 Ohio Op. 405, 407 (1940).
32 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 753, 874-5: "ET~he acceptance today of adoption as
a desirable social policy . . . is so far ahead of portions of the law in many countries
that some strange anomalies appear. . . . The adopted child is treated, if not in law,
certainly in practice, in all respects as the child of his new family. . . . Are we willing
to let the law catch up to the parties?"
33 "Essentials of Adoption Law and Procedure," Children's Bureau Publication No.
331, p. 7 (1949): "To afford real safeguards to the children for whose protection the
adoption law is designed, the steps necessary to bring related laws into conformity with
sound child welfare practice should be taken." See also Cochrel v. Robinson, supra note
14; Campbell v. Musart Society, supra note 7. But cf. In re Friedman, supra note 18.
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implemented by the courts as well.34 The narrow construction of instruments
so as to exclude adopted children from terms such as "child," "heir" or "de-
scendant" is a definite step backward in the advance of social and legal think-
ing in the problems of adoption. Such a retreat is deplorable in this era in
which so many families have found happiness and so many potential wards
of the state have been socially benefitted by the development of adoption as
a respected institution in our society.35 It would be well for the courts to
recognize and encourage the benefits that this creature of legislative imagina-
tion has bestowed upon us.
34 Kennedy, supra note 26, at 760, 875: "In the light of today's concept of an adopted
child as a full member of an adopting family, a court will not be wrong when, putting
aside a technical approach, it gives a larger measure of recognition to the effect of
adoption.... Our courts can do much to help by so construing existing legislation, as
they may easily do, as to place the child in the position of a lawful child of his new
parents in as large a number of situations as possible.... Making the child the child of
his adopting parents 'to all intents and purposes' ought to cover relationship to his adopt-
ing parents' kindred."
35 Ransom v. N.Y.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., supra note 10, at 227, 112 N.E. at 587:
"These sections of the statutes are so plain and palpable that they need no construction.
They are their own interpreters. Thousands of children, who otherwise, through some
misfortune, have had denied them proper natural parentage, have been by the law of
the land, the adoption statutes, provided with comfortable homes and legal parents.
Certainly where statutes are so simple and so certain of their purpose . . . , no court
should pervert or divert those terms so as to defeat the sound and wholesome public
policy announced in these most humanitarian laws that provide children for childless
parents and provide parents for parentless children."
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